A surprisingly large number of maritime boundaries remain unresolved around the globe, and East Asia has some particularly diffi cult disputes. According to one recent estimate, 259 of the planet's 427 boundary disputes have not yet been delimited.
II. Th e Sea of Okhotsk
Th e Soviet Union, and now Russia, has occasionally suggested that the Sea of Okhotsk consists of internal waters and has drawn aggressive baselines along certain coastal areas within the Sea. Th e United States and other maritime countries reject Russia's view and characterize Okhotsk as a "semi-enclosed sea" governed by Articles 122 and 123 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
3 According to this view, although much of the Sea is covered by Russia's exclusive economic zones (EEZs), a "peanut hole" of high seas exists in the middle of the Sea, which is governed by the high seas provisions of the Convention.
III. Peter the Great Bay
Th e Soviet Union, and now Russia, has claimed that Peter the Great Bay, just north of Korea, is a "historic bay" under Article 10(6) of the Law of the Sea Convention and thus that the Bay consists of internal waters. Th e Bay does not meet the "semicircle" test required by Article 10(2) and has an entrance longer than 24 nautical miles (n.m.), and the United States has protested this claim.
IV. Th e Northern Territories
One of the most contentious and festering of Northeast Asia's disputes concerns the small islands north of Hokkaido controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan as an essential part of its national territory. Th ese islands -usually called the "Northern Territories" -include the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashir (Kunashiri in Japanese), and Iturup (Etorufu), and they contain a combined land area of 5,000 square kilometers. Th e Soviet Union took these islands taken from Japan after World War II, 4 and expelled the 17,000 Japanese residents. Russia now claims title based on the language in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which Japan "renounced all right and title to the Kuril Islands." But Japan argues that these islands are not covered by this phrase, because they were not among the islands Japan had acquired in 1875 in exchange for Sakhalin, and that, historically, they bays.
11 Professor Paik has concluded that: "It seems very doubtful that the East Korea Bay and the small indentation north of it would fall under the category of historic bays." 12 South Korean vessels do not at present challenge North Korea's trapezoidalshaped EEZ claim extending from this line, to avoid controversy and because the disputed area is not thought to be a resource-rich area. In February 2000, nongovernmental fi sheries associations in North and South Korea negotiated an agreement that allowed South Korean vessels to fi sh in North Korea's EEZ in the East Sea until 2005, with profi ts to be shared between the two countries. 13 About 400 South Korean squid vessels took advantage of this arrangement.
North Korea's claimed maritime zones in the East Sea cannot be justifi ed under the Law of the Sea Convention or any other principles of customary international law. It is true that North Korea is somewhat geographically disadvantaged, having a concave coastline and having two neighbors (Russia and South Korea) that wrap around it. North Korea is entitled to maritime zones that allow it to project into the sea, but the principles of maritime delimitation are not designed to restructure the realities created by physical geography. Th e delimitation line between North and South Korea should thus be the equidistance line, which would go north of the line now claimed by North Korea and would give South Korea more maritime space. 14 
Th e West Sea (Yellow Sea)
It will be challenging to reach agreement on the maritime boundary in the West Sea/Yellow Sea because of the fi ve South Korean islands nestled close to the North Korean coast, and because of the disputed status and location of the "Northern Limit Line."
15 South Korea controls the islands of Paengyong, Taechong, Sochong, Yongpyong, and Woo which hug the western North Korean coast, coming at the closest point to within seven-n.m. of North Korea. South Korea views the maritime boundary between the two countries as the median line between these islands and the North Korean coast, based on a line called the "Northern Limit Line" (NLL), which was drawn by the United Nations Command a month after the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, leaving very little ocean space for North Korea. 16 Th ese fi ve islands have a total of fi ve square miles and were said in 1978 to be occupied by 13,000 people. 17 North Korea does not challenge South Korean sovereignty over the islands themselves, but because the islets are within 12-n.m. of North Korea's coast, North Korea has contended that the waters around the fi ve islets are part of North Korea's territorial sea.
In September 1999, North Korea unilaterally announced that it had redrawn the line so as to extend from the land boundary perpendicular from the coastline into the Yellow Sea, and was prepared to enforce this line "by various means." 18 Th e immediate cause of this dispute was apparently a concentration of crabs south of the Northern Limit Line and eff orts by North Korean vessels to harvest these crustaceans. 19 Incidents are not uncommon in this area, and violent clashes occurred during the crab seasons in June 1999 and June 2002. 20 Th e NLL has served a useful purpose as a line of military control and should continue in place until the two Koreas can reach agreement to end their state of war. But if the two Koreas were independent countries, the NLL would probably not stand as a legitimate maritime boundary under the "equitable principles" that have evolved from the decisions of based on Articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea Convention, because it denies North Korea access to adjacent sea areas. Th e NLL is thus contrary to the principle of "non-encroachment" 21 because it blocks North Korea's access to the ocean in this region. Further, according to legal precedents 16 See Prescott, supra note 8, at 48-51. 17 21 Th e principle of non-encroachment is included explicitly in Article 7(6) of the Law of the Sea Convention, which says that no state can use a system of straight baselines "in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." It played a signifi cant role in the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 69 para. 70, and 79-81 para. 92, where the Court emphasized the importance of avoiding the blockage of a coastal state's entry into the sea. Even though Norway's tiny Jan Mayen island was minuscule in comparison with Denmark's Greenland, Norway was allocated a maritime zone suffi cient to give it equitable access to the important capelin fi shery that lies between the two land features. Th e unusual 16-n.m.-wide and 200-n.m.-long corridor drawn in the Delimitation of the Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 31 I.L.M. 1149 (1992), appears to have been based on a desire to avoid cutting off these islands' coastal fronts into the sea. But, at the same time, the arbitral tribunal accepted Canada's argument and international practice, islands do not have an equal capacity with land masses to create maritime zones, nor do they command equal strength with an opposing continental area or land mass.
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Using an analogy from the Anglo-French Arbitration, 23 territorial sea enclaves could be drawn around the fi ve South Korean islands, but the islands themselves would be ignored in drawing the main maritime boundary. Although the territorial sea around these islands would normally be 12-n.m., because they are all so close to the North Korean coast and crowded among each other, this geographical situation might dictate the drawing of smaller territorial seas. 24 Maps have also been prepared showing a hypothetical median line which would give North Korea a "fi nger" through these islands. 25 Because the fi ve South Korean islands are within 12-n.m. of North Korea, careful negotiation will inevitably be necessary to address and resolve this dispute.
VI. Th e East Sea/Sea of Japan
Th e East Sea/Sea of Japan is a resource rich semi-enclosed sea that presents a diffi cult boundary delimitation challenge.
Baselines
Article 7(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention allows countries to use straight baselines if their coastline is deeply indented or a fringe of off shore islands masks the coastline, but under Article 7(3), the straight baselines must not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast. 26 Once straight-baselines are drawn, the waters landward of these lines are "internal waters," which are totally controlled by that the French islands should not be permitted to cut off the access of Canada's Newfoundland coast to the open ocean. 22 See infra text accompanying notes 114-18 and 163-64. 23 the coastal country, and the next 12-n.m. are "territorial sea," which is sovereign territory, and through which vessels can pass only if the passage is "innocent."
For maritime boundary purposes, baselines become crucial because any median or equidistance line that might be drawn to divide overlapping maritime zones would start from the baselines. Japan's baseline claims are of questionable legitimacy in some locations. Japan's fi rst eff ort at baseline delimitation occurred in 1977 in its Law on the Territorial Sea (Law No. 30), which went into eff ect on July 1, 1977. Its straight-baseline claims are disputed because Japan's coastline is not generally viewed as being "deeply indented" nor does it have "fringing islands." Some baselines connect remote islands far from the main islands, and some are more than 50 miles long. Deputy Minister Lark-Jung Choi of Korea's Ministry of Maritime Aff airs and Fisheries (MOMAF) has explained that 46 of Japan's straight baselines exceed 24-n.m. in length and 21 exceed 40-n.m.
27 Th e longest baseline is 62.26-n.m. in the area west of Kyushu. Korean scholars and offi cials complain in particular about the straight baselines that are drawn around Wakasa Bay, Toyama Bay, and Kyushi Bay, which do not meet the defi nition in Article 10 of the Law of the Sea Convention of a legal bay, 28 as well as those drawn in the Shikoku area, Nodu Bay, and Hekurajima, "and in many other places."
29 Th ese straight baselines, if accepted, would have the eff ect of increasing Japan's territorial sea by about 13% and its EEZ by almost 25%.
30
Deputy Minister Choi has said that "Korea must make it clear during the EEZ delimitation negotiations that [Japan's] unlawful baselines cannot be accepted as the proper basis of establishing maritime delimitation."
31
In June 1997, a South Korean captain was arrested by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency for violating the Japanese "Law concerning Regulation of Fishing Activities by Foreigners," which prohibits foreign fi shing in Japan's territorial sea. His vessel was 18.9 miles off the coast of Hamada, Shimane Prefecture, but was deemed by Japan to be within its territorial waters because of its baseline claims. Japan adopted its baselines without consultation or acquiescence by South Korea, and in apparent violation of the 1965 Fishery Treaty between the two countries, which required such consultations.
32 Japanese courts at fi rst reached inconsistent conclusions on the legal issues raised by this and other arrests, but eventually reached the conclusion that Japan had the unilateral right to declare and defi ne its territorial sea and could exercise exclusive jurisdiction in the area. 38 Th eir location in the middle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan -50 miles southeast of Korea's Ullungdo and 90 miles northwest of Japan's Oki Islands -gives them an importance and status if they were to have an eff ect on the delimitation of marine space. Th ey have served as a fi shing station for harvesting abalone and seaweed and hunting seals, and they are near rich fi shing grounds.
Korea's claim to Dokdo goes back many centuries and is based on contacts during many previous eras. 39 Japan asserts, on the other hand, that Dokdo (which it calls Takeshima) was terra nullius in 1905 and that Japan acted in accordance with international law in claiming and incorporating the islets into Japanese territory at that time. Korea views this initiative as part of Japan's aggressive and illegal 32 Korea's claim to sovereignty over the islets is stronger than that of Japan, based on the historical evidence of its exercise of authority, the connection between Japan's 1905 claim of annexation and its expansionist activities over the Korean Peninsula, the principle of contiguity (because the islets are closer to Korea's Ullong-do than to Japan's Oki Islands), and Korea's actual physical control of the islands during the past half century. 41 Th e judicial and arbitral decisions regarding sovereignty disputes over islands since World War II have focused more on which country has exercised actual governmental control over the feature during the previous century, than on earlier historical records. 42 Th e fi rst major decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding ownership of an isolated uninhabited island feature was the decision in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 43 where the Court explained that: "What is of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups." 44 Th is view was followed in the Gulf of Fonseca Case, 45 where the court focused on evidence of actual recent occupation and acquiescence by other countries to determine title to disputed islets, and in the decision in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, 46 where the tribunal relied explicitly on the Minquiers and Ecrehos judgment for the proposition that it is the relatively recent history of use and possession of the islets that is most instructive in determining sovereignty and that the historical-title claims off ered by each side were not ultimately helpful in resolving the dispute: "Th e modern international law of acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis." 47 Th is very same approach was utilized by the Court in its recent decision resolving a dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over two tiny islets -Ligitan and Sipadan.
48 Th e larger of the islets (Sipadan) is 0.13 square kilometers in size.
49
Neither has been inhabited historically, but both have lighthouses on them and Sipadan has recently been "developed into a tourist resort for scuba-diving." 50 Th e Court fi rst addressed arguments based on earlier treaties, maps, and succession, but found that they did not establish any clear sovereignty. 51 It then looked at the "eff ectivites" -or actual examples of exercises of sovereignty over the islets, and explained that it would look at exercises of sovereignty, even if they did "not coexist with any legal title." 52 Indonesia claimed title based on various naval exercises in the area conducted by themselves and previously by their colonial power (the Netherlands), but Malaysia prevailed based on the governmental actions of its colonial power (the United Kingdom) exercising control over turtle egg collection and constructing lighthouses on both islets.
53
Th e language and rulings provided by the Court are directly relevant to the Dokdo dispute. Th e Court's opinion explained that "a claim of sovereignty based on . . . continued display of authority . . . involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority." 54 In "areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries," the Court "has been satisfi ed with very little," 55 but the contrary claims of other countries will also be relevant.
56 Th e Court relied upon only those displays 47 Id. Th e consistent reasoning in these ICJ decisions strengthens Korea's claim of sovereignty to Dokdo. Korea was not in a position to exercise control during the fi rst part of the twentieth century because it had been annexed by Japan, but as soon as it regained its independence it asserted control over the islets, and has continued to exercise sovereignty over them since then. In July 2001, the South Korean National Maritime Police Agency announced it would commission a 5,000-ton-class vessel carrying a crew of 97 -entitled the Sambong, the name of Tok-do during the Choson Dynasty -to patrol the waters around Tok-do beginning in February 2002.
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Article 121(3) of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 60 says that "rocks" that "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" are entitled to a 12-n.m. territorial sea, but not an EEZ or a continental shelf. Th e terms in this provision are not defi ned elsewhere in the Convention, and commentators have debated whether a geological feature must literally be a "rock" to be denied an EEZ or continental shelf or whether all features that "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" are in this category. 61 Judge Budislav Vukas has recently explained that the latter interpretation is the correct one, because of the underlying purposes of establishing the EEZ.
62 Th e reason for giving exclusive rights to the coastal states was to protect the economic interests its disagreement or protest" regarding the construction of lighthouses on Ligitan and Sipadan in the early 1960s. of the coastal communities that depended on the resources of the sea, and thus to promote their economic development and enable them to feed themselves.
63
Th is rationale does not apply to uninhabited islands, because they have no coastal fi shing communities that require such assistance. 64 Th e EEZ regime may also be "useful for the more eff ective preservation of the marine resources," 65 but it is not necessary to give exclusive rights to achieve this goal, and multilateral solutions such as Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 66 can serve to protect fragile resources. 67 An important example of "state practice" relevant to the meaning of Article 121(3) occurred in 1997 when the United Kingdom renounced any claim to an EEZ or continental shelf around its barren granite feature named Rockall which juts out of the ocean northwest of Scotland. 68 Rockall is a towering granite feature measuring about 200 feet (61 meters) in circumference, which is about seventy feet (21 meters) high. 69 An earlier regionally-important example of state practice on this issue occurred in 1970, when the Republic of China (Taiwan) issued a reservation when ratifying the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 70 apparently with reference to the Daioyu-Dao (Senkakus), stating that in "determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into account."
71 One prominent scholar from the People's Republic of China has reported that the position of the People's Republic of China is similar: "China holds that the Diaoyudao Islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own, and that they are not entitled to have a continental shelf." 72 63 Id. paras. 3-5. 64 Id. para. 6. 65 Whatever emerges as the ultimate defi nition of "rock" in Article 121(3) of the 1982 Convention, it would appear to be clear that Dokdo will be covered by this term. Th e two tiny rocky islets that make up Dokdo consist of barren and windswept structures with limited water sources. In a 1966 publication, the features of the islets were described as follows:
Both islets are barren and rocky, with the exception of some grass on the eastern islet, and their coasts consist of precipitous rocky cliff s. Th ere are numerous caves where sea-lions resort. Th ese islets are temporarily inhabited during the summer by fi shermen. 73 Fishing vessels have visited the islets during the mild summer months, and, since 1954, the Republic of Korea has kept marine police on them, but Korean scholars have acknowledged that these islets are unsuitable for human habitation.
74 Two distinguished foreign commentators have stated that: "Th ese islets are uninhabitable, and under Article 121 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea should not have an EEZ or continental shelf."
75 Another widely-published Korean scholar has written, after discussing the language in Article 121(3), that "the natural conditions of the Dokdo Islands would suggest that these islands might not generate their own EEZs or continental shelves."
76 One of the early Korean names given to the islets was "Sokdo," which is signifi cant because "sok" means "rock" in Korean. 77 Japan, on the other hand, has tended to take the position that all islands and islets, no matter how small, should be able to generate extended maritime zones, without regard to their size or habitability, and Japan has apparently claimed an EEZ around all its islets, no matter how small or uninhabitable. Japan ratifi ed the Law that the Senkaku Islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own, and that they are not entitled to have continental shelf "). 73 Hydrographer of the Navy, 1 Japan Pilot 200 (HMSO, London, 1966 of the Sea Convention on June 7, 1996 and promulgated its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf on July 20, 1996, but the exact extent of the Japanese EEZ remains unclear. A Japanese foundation has published a map that draws 200-n.m. zones around every Japanese islet, no matter how small and uninhabitable, but the Japanese government has never produced an offi cial map showing the full extent of its claims.
78 Japan has apparently argued that Dokdo qualify as "an island and should not be disregarded in a continental shelf delimitation, without indicating the weight to be attributed to [them] in a delimitation." 79 A 1996 newspaper article quoted a Japanese Foreign Ministry offi cial who requested anonymity as saying that "I think Takeshima actually can sustain some human habitation."
80 Some other countries, including the United States, 81 have also been expansive in claiming extended maritime space around features that are clearly rocks, and the legitimacy of such claims remains in dispute. 82 Th e better approach appears to be the one that the Republic of Korea has tended to accept -that small uninhabited islets should not be able to generate EEZs and continental shelves. 83 If Japan and Korea could agree that Dokdo would not be entitled to generate a continental shelf or EEZ, that agreement might go a long way to reducing the tension over sovereignty of the islets. If the maritime boundary eventually becomes the equidistance line between Korea's Ullong-do and Japan's Oki Island, then Dok-Do would be on the Korean side and should not aff ect the boundary delimitation.
Th e 1998 Fisheries Agreement
In 1998, Japan and Korea entered into a new fi sheries agreement 84 duced two "provisional zones" or "intermediate zones" in disputed areas, where fi shing vessels from each country can operate, and also included a commitment by both countries to reduce their overall catch. One shared zone is in the Sea of Japan/East Sea near the disputed islets of Dokdo and the other is in the East China Sea south of Cheju Island and just north of the Japan-China Provisional Measure Zone. Th ird countries do not have rights to fi sh in these shared zones. Th e agreement also gave each country a zone that extends 35-n.m. from the coastlines, which is called an EEZ, allowing each country, after the fi rst three years during which historic fi shing rights are phased out, to harvest an equal amount from the other's zone. Th is agreement has been seen as a "provisional agreement" as called for in Article 74(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention pending fi nal determination of the maritime boundary.
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Th e 1998 Treaty established a compromise joint-use zone around Dokdo, and carefully regulated how much fi sh of each species could be caught within the zone, and in the adjacent national-jurisdiction zones. Th e agreement had the eff ect of reducing South Korean fi shing in Japanese waters, but South Korea did retain access to part of the productive Yamato Bank, where some 1,000 South Korean vessels had been catching about 25,000 metric tons of squid each year (but the Korean catch was to be gradually reduced to the same level as that of the Japanese vessels).
Th e Territorial Sea in the Straits
Japan -which asserts a 12-n.m. territorial sea in general -claims only a three-n.m. territorial sea in the Soya Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, the eastern and western channels of the Tsushima Strait, and the Osumi Strait.
86 South Korea has also limited its territorial-sea claim around the land areas adjacent to the Korean Strait to threen.m., in order to permit unimpeded passage through this area.
Agreed Boundaries Between Japan and Korea
Japan and the Republic of Korea entered into two agreements in 1974 -a delimitation of part of their continental shelf boundary 87 development zone in disputed territory. 88 Th e agreed continental shelf boundary is based on a median line which starts at the midpoint between Korea's Cheju Island and Japan's Goto Retto and then heads north, moving closer to the Korean coastline because of the Japanese island of Tsushima in the Korean Strait and then veering back away from the Korean coast as it heads north. Th is line stops abruptly at a spot known as Point 35 because of the claims both countries have for sovereignty over Dokdo and their disagreement over whether it should play a role in determining the boundary delimitation in that region.
Th e Joint Development Zone
In the second agreement, Japan and Korea established a joint development zone in a disputed area south of Cheju Island to permit each country to explore for hydrocarbons. Korea argued that Japan's "Tori-shima group [of islands], separated by a deep trench on the seabed from the main Japanese islands, was not entitled to claim a continental shelf " 89 and thus that, using the natural-prolongation principle, Korea's boundary should extend almost to these Japanese islands.
90 Japan disagreed, advocating use of an equidistance line. It took protracted negotiations to develop a joint development zone in the disputed area. Korea ratifi ed the agreement right away in 1974, but Japan's ratifi cation did not occur until 1978. 91 Th at same year, Japan and Korea established an agreed framework whereby both countries agreed to engage in joint exploration of the continental shelf by 2028. Th is joint exploration has been underway, and in August 2002, the Korea National Oil Corporation agreed with the Japan National Oil Corporation to resume cooperation which had begun in 1986.
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Th e natural prolongation theory relied upon by Korea was prominent in 1974, but it has not been utilized by any tribunal adjudicating a maritime boundary during the past two or three decades. It may be, therefore, that when it is time to reexamine this agreement, Korea's negotiating position will be weakened. Abandoning the natural-prolongation argument would not mean, however, that Korea must give Japan the entire area now covered by the Joint Development Zone, because " northwest side of the zone . . . corresponds almost exactly to the line of equidistance between Japan and South Korea if the Danjo Gunto are given full eff ect." 93 Korea need not allow the tiny and isolated Danjo Gunto islets to have full eff ect or even any eff ect in drawing the equidistance line, and the other small southern Japanese islands can also be discounted because their coastlines are limited in relationship to that of the opposite Korean coast. Korea should be entitled, therefore, to a portion -probably between one-fourth and one-third -of the area now covered by the Joint Development Zone.
VII. Th e Maritime Boundary Between Korea and China

China's Baseline Claims
China's use of a high-tide elevation about 70-n.m. off Shanghai called Dongdao (Barren Island) is of dubious legitimacy and has been challenged by its neighbors because it is so far from the coast and thus departs dramatically from the general direction of the coastline. China has also used some low-tide elevations as basepoints for its baselines. 117, 1996) , at 3 ("Much of China's coastline does not meet either of the two LOS Convention geographic conditions required for applying straight baselines," i.e., a deeply indented coastline or a fringe of islands along the coast). 96 See Gab-Yong, Jeong, supra note 28, at 4-9. 97 Choi, supra note 27, at 8.
Bohai Bai
China has always claimed the large Bohai Bay just below Korea as a historic bay. Th e distance between the headlands defi ning the bay is 55-n.m. across, 98 and thus fails to meet the defi nition of a juridical bay in Article 10(4) of the Law of the Sea Convention (which limits such bays to bodies of water with an entrance point less than 24-n.m. across), but China argues that the small islands scattered across the mouth of the Bay strengthen its claim. Th ese small islands could be viewed as "a fringe of islands" that mask the coast under Article 7(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention, thus justifying the drawing a straight baselines across the mouth of the Bohai. On the other hand, it could be argued that these baselines do not follow "the general direction of the coast" and thus violate Article 7(3) of the Convention. Th e Republic of Korea understands China's claim, but has never acknowledged its legitimacy. Japan has raised reservations about the claim. Th e United States has apparently not objected to China's historic-bay claim for Bohai Bay. 
Delimiting the Boundary
China has always argued that the "natural prolongation" approach should be used in both the Yellow Sea (West Sea) and the East China Sea, which, according to China's theory, entitles China to ownership of the entire continental shelf off its coast to a "silt line," "which divides the sands derived from Korea and the silty sediments that have fl owed out from the Hwang Ho and Yangstze Rivers and given name to the Yellow Sea." 100 Th is sedimentation apparently "is also refl ected in the topography of the seabed, feature by an axial valley two-thirds across the Yellow Sea towards Korea, which divides a smooth gentle slope extending from the Chinese shore from the steep and less regular slope off the Korean coast."
101 Th is "silt line" has been drawn on a published map, 102 and it would cover about half of the maritime zone the Republic of Korea would be entitled to if an equidistance line were drawn between its coast and that of China. At times, China has made an even more expansive claim, arguing that it is entitled to all the submerged land 98 Prescott, supra note 8, at 16. 99 But China has been able to act pragmatically and has set aside its position on natural prolongation in order to enter into a sophisticated fi shing agreement with the Republic of Korea. Th e two countries normalized their diplomatic relationship in 1992, and began discussing fi shing issues in 1993. Th eir confl icting positions came into focus after both countries ratifi ed the Law of the Sea Convention and proclaimed EEZs. Th ese claims overlap, and China's straight baseline claim, which South Korea has offi cially protested as incompatible with the Law of the Sea Convention, also has created diffi culties. 104 As explained above, 105 Korea has challenged China's use of Dongdao (a barren islet about 70-n.m. east of Shanghai) as a basepoint, and also challenges several other basepoints north of Shanghai.
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In 1997-98, the two countries fi nally agreed: (a) to recognize coastal EEZ areas where each country can exercise exclusive sovereign rights over the resources (the width of this zone varies but averages 60-n.m. from the coastline and provides each country with roughly equal areas); 107 (b) to establish a joint fi shing area ("Provisional Regulatory Zone") in the central area where their claimed EEZs overlap (drawn from a hypothetical median line), where they exercise equal rights and manage the species through the Korea-China Joint Fisheries Committee; and (c) to create a transitional area ("Interim Co-management Zone") extending 20 miles in both directions from the joint fi shing area, where the resources were shared for four years, and thereafter became part of each countries' coastal EEZ, under exclusive coastal state control. Th ey established a Joint Fisheries Commission to recommend measures for conserving and managing the resources. And, very signifi cantly, they agreed to conduct joint surveillance operations -with authorities of both countries physically present on the patrol boats -to monitor and control illegal and indiscriminate fi shing activities.
Th is fi shing agreement is a signifi cant step forward, and it indicates that China may be willing to abandon its natural-prolongation approach, at least with regard to delimitation of the living resources. Korea's position has always been that its boundary with China should be drawn with an equidistance line. Article 5(2) of the Korean Exclusive Economic Zone states that the equidistance line should be used if no other agreement can be reached, and MOMAF Deputy Minister Choi has expressed the view that: "Since there is no other factor to aff ect the principle of equity, the equidistance line seems to be the equitable standard in the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China." 108 
VIII. Th e Maritime Boundary Between Japan and China in the East China Sea
China claims that the whole continental shelf of the Yellow Sea belongs to China on the basis of the natural prolongation theory. China utilizes the natural prolongation theory to claim the continental shelf across the East China Sea to its "silt line" or beyond to the Okinawa Trough, and challenges the Joint Development Agreement and the fi shing agreement covering the area south of Cheju Island between Korea and Japan as infringing upon its sovereign resources.
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Th e "natural prolongation" approach emerged from the 1969 decision of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 110 but it has not been utilized in decisions rendered during the past two or three decades. Th e demise of the natural prolongation theory has been explained to be a product of the recognition in the Law of the Sea Convention that coastal states are entitled to 200-n.m. continental shelves even if the sea fl oor around them does not conform to a geographic defi nition of a continental shelf. Th e ICJ explained in the Libya/Malta Case that "since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between their claims." 111 Prescott explained after the Libya/Malta Case that "the court seemed to decide that natural prolongation was not a matter to be considered when the waters between the states were less than 400 nm wide. It is 108 Id. at 8. 109 See supra text accompanying notes 100-03. 110 almost as though countries sharing seas less than 400 nm wide would be drawing EEZ boundaries rather than continental shelf boundaries."
112 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia have reported that the natural prolongation doctrine "is now somewhat discredited as a basis for continental shelf delimitation." 113 Japan argues that the boundary in the East China Sea should be the equidistance or median line between China's coastline and the small Japanese islands that extend south of Japan's main islands. Th e equidistance line is now commonly used as the starting point for delimitation, but it is adjusted generally to provide some rough proportionality between the lengths of the opposite coasts.
It has now become well established that an essential element of a boundary delimitation is the calculation of the relative lengths of the relevant coastlines. If this ratio is not roughly comparable to the ratio of the provisionally-delimited maritime space allocated to each country, then the tribunal will generally make an adjustment to bring the ratios into line with each other. 114 In the Libya/Malta Case, for instance, the ICJ started with the median lines between the countries, but then adjusted the line northward through 18' of latitude to take account of the "very marked diff erence in coastal lengths" 115 between the two countries. Th e Court then confi rmed the appropriateness of this solution by examining the "proportionality" of the length of the coastlines of the two countries 116 and the "equitableness of the result." 117 In the Jan Mayen Case, the ICJ determined that the ratio of the relevant coasts of Jan Mayen (Norway) to Greenland (Denmark) was 1:9, and ruled that this dramatic diff erence required a departure from reliance on the equidistance line. Th e fi nal result was perhaps a compromise between an equidistance approach and a proportionality-of-the-coasts approach, with Denmark (Greenland) receiving three times as much maritime space as Norway (Jan Mayen). 1986) , the arbitral tribunal also evaluated the "proportionality" of the coasts to determine whether an "equitable solution" had been achieved by the boundary line chosen. Id. para. 120. 118 See also the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, supra note 46, where the tribunal relied upon the test of "a reasonable degree of proportionality" to determine the equitableness the boundary line; the tribunal was satisfi ed that this test was met, in light of the Eritrea-Yemen coastal length ratio Using this approach, the boundary line would be moved eastward from the equidistance line toward Japan's islands. Th erefore, although China's natural prolongation approach does not have the clout it used to, Japan's strict equidistance approach is also unsupported by recent arbitral and judicial decisions. A tribunal today would move the line eastward, thus giving China more ocean space than Japan, but perhaps less than the distance to the Okinawa Trough, which is what China is seeking.
Th is dispute has been heating up and presents the possibility of a major confrontation. In September 2005, China sent fi ve warships, including a guided missile destroyer, to the Chunxiao gas fi eld, which is on China's side of the equidistance line, which Japan worries may be draining gas from Japan's side. 119 According to Admiral Lang Ning-li, the recently retired head of Taiwan's naval intelligence: "It is like the 1930s again, when the Central Pacifi c became a vital concern to both the United States and Japan, whose navy was expanding. Th at means there could be confl ict between China and Japan, which both see these seas as vital, and can't share this space." 120 A few months earlier, Japan had granted rights to the Japanese fi rm Teikoku Oil Company to test drill for gas and oil in a part of the East China Sea disputed by the two countries, a move that the China Daily said would make confl ict between the two nations inevitable. 121 
Th e Senkakus/Diaoyu Dao Islands
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Th ese eight uninhabited features in the East China Sea (fi ve islets and three barren rocks) are disputed between China/Taiwan and Japan. Altogether, they have a land area of seven square kilometers, and the largest (Diaoyu Dao/Uotsuri Shima) has an area of 4.3 square kilometers, with two peaks rising to about 1100 feet, but with no anchorages for any but the smallest ships to use for landings. Th e islets are 170 kilometers from Taiwan and 410 kilometers from Okinawa. Th e 2,270-meter-deep Okinawa Trough separates these islets from the nearest undisputed Japanese island. Historically, these outcroppings have been used only as navigational aids.
China and Taiwan claim these islets based on discovery by Chinese in 1372, plus they were mentioned in a Chinese text in 1403, and were incorporated into China's coastal defense system by the Ming Government in 1562. Th ey also explain that fi shers from northern Taiwan used the islets as shelters for a long period of time; that the Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi awarded property rights to three of them to a U.S. citizen of Chinese ancestry in 1893 to gather rare and precious medicinal herbs; that the islets were transferred to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in May 1895 after the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War (as "islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa") and therefore should have been returned after World War II according to the 1943 Cairo Declaration (which proclaimed that Japan would be required to return all "territories which she has taken by violence and greed"), the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, and Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty; and that, prior to 1945, Japan administered the islets through the Taipei Prefecture, not the Okinawa Prefecture. 123 China's 1992 territorial-sea legislation asserted control over the islets and claims territorial seas around them.
Japan's claim is based on "discovery" of the islets by a Japanese national (Tatsushiro Koga) in 1884, followed by formal incorporation of the islets into Japanese territory by the Japanese Cabinet on January 14, 1895, after the islets were deemed to be "terra nullius."
124 Koga attempted economic activity such as fi sh and bird-canning and the collection of birds' feathers and guano between 1896 and his death in 1918, but these activities were not economically successful and no other economic activity has been attempted. Th e United States administered the islets after World War II and transferred jurisdiction to Japan in 1951, but specifi ed that this action did not aff ect the determination of sovereignty over the disputed islands.
125 Japan has administered the islets from 1895 to 1945 and from 1951 to the present. In June 2005, a fl otilla of Taiwanese fi shing vessels circled around these islets to protest Japanese restrictions on fi shing in the region.
Professor Lee Keun-Gwan has observed that Japan's claim to the Senkakus/ Diaoyu Dao and to Dokdo/Takeshima are both based on an argument that they were terrae nullius, "discovered" and then "eff ectively occupied" by Japan, and that "in both cases the measure of occupation was taken during armed confl icts, that is, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War respectively in which Japan emerged victorious." 126 He observed that although "occupation" may sound "neutral on its own," during the age of imperialism it "became a powerful conceptual tool for the acquisition or aggrandizement of territory by European states" and that this method of acquiring territory "is, quite often, deeply tainted with European expansionism and colonialism." 127 And, as applied to Japan's claims to the Senkakus and Dokdo/Takeshima, the doctrines of "discovery" and "occupation" are "a technical or legal camoufl age that serves to justify an essentially expansionist and colonialist act on the part of the pre-1945 Japan." 128 As explained above, 129 Chinese and Taiwanese scholars have acknowledged that the Daioyu Dao do not qualify under Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention to generate EEZs and continental shelves, but it is not clear whether Japan accepts that position, and when Taiwan ratifi ed the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention in 1970, it specifi cally stated that in "determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into account." 130 In any event, these tiny islets should not play a role in determining how the maritime boundary in this region should be delimited.
IX. Th e South China Sea
the South China Sea, using 11 interrupted lines to indicate the boundary of the islands, islets, reefs, banks and adjacent waters over which China exercised sovereignty."
132 Two of these lines in the Tonkin Gulf area were later eliminated, 133 and so this confi guration has come to be known as the "nine interrupted lines." Th ey swing deep into the South China Sea making a tongue-like confi guration. Some commentators view these lines benignly, and describe them simply as a claim to the islets enclosed in the lines, 134 but at least some Chinese view it as a claim to the waters as well. China has not yet claimed an EEZ. It issued a listing of baselines on May 15, 1996 that connected the Paracels, but made no mention of the Spratlys, saying cryptically that "[t]he Government of the People's Republic of China will announce the remaining baselines of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China at another time."
135 Th e nature of the claim thus remains shrouded in mystery. Occasionally, however, Chinese statements -and, more importantly, Chinese actions -indicate that China actually claims all the waters and resources within these lines.
In a paper delivered in 1994 by Pan Shiying, a senior research fellow at the Institute for International Technological Economic Studies in Beijing who is thought by some to speak for the People's Liberation Army -Navy (PLAN), the author characterized this line as making a claim for "historic title" to the area.
He defended this claim based on the international law that existed at that time, and noted that no nation protested the line for a number of years after it appeared, and that several scholars have reprinted it. His paper noted that "the application of the interrupted lines, rather than uninterrupted lines make future adjustments possible," and ultimately recommended some form of joint development of the region.
A second paper delivered by the Taiwanese scholar Yann-huei Song at the same conference 137 similarly defended the historic land claim but did not conclude exactly what the status of the waters within this line should be. He noted that neither the People's Republic of China (PRC) nor the Taiwan government had ever protested the movement of ships through these waters and stated that "the PRC government has never claimed the waters enclosed in the line as historic waters." He hinted that China might try to connect baselines between the Spratlys and claim the waters within those baselines as internal waters, with the waters outside being within a claimed EEZ, but he also seemed to understand the diffi culties with such a claim. 138 On May 18, 1995, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang stated that China's claim to the Spratlys is not designed to impede freedom of navigation through the area, but he refused to explain how China defi ned its claims around the islets. 139 Some commentators writing after May 1995 have stated that China has abandoned its previous ambiguous claim to the waters of the South China Sea based on the "nine-interrupted-lines" map, 140 but China's actual position remains shrouded in ambiguity. China's historical claim is a weak one, but its persistence in maintaining this claim makes it diffi cult to delimit the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea.
Th e Role of Taiwan
Taiwan's involvement in the South China Sea controversies increases the complexity of these issues. On March 10, 1993, Taiwan adopted "Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea," which asserted sovereignty over "the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfi eld Bank and the Pratas Islands" and also stated that: "Th e South China Sea area within the historic water limit is the maritime area under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China, in which the Republic of China possesses all rights and interests."
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In April 1995, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Aff airs reemphasized this position by saying: "Undoubtedly, our government has sovereignty over the historic U-shaped territory, including the Spratly Islands."
142 Taiwan now occupies the largest of the Spratly islets -Itu Aba (Tai Ping Dao) -and reportedly has stationed 600 marines there. 143 Taiwan's activities in the Spratlys as well as its position on the issues have often supported those of China. In fact, it has been reported that the Chinese garrisons in the Spratlys receive fresh water supplies from the Taiwanese troops on Itu Aba.
Resolving the Sovereignty Disputes
Th e key decisions addressing sovereignty disputes over small islets -the Clipperton, Palmas, Minquiers and Ecrehos and Gulf of Fonseca precedents
144 -all focus on "discovery," and, in particular, on "occupation" of small islets. Although they do not require too much activity when the islet is uninhabitable, they do demand some formal acts and a suffi cient presence to let others know of the claim. In the Spratlys, no nation's claim appears to have been suffi ciently strong or unchallengeable to persuade others to keep out of the region. Although China has argued that Western requirements of formal declarations of sovereignty should not apply in Asia, their suggested substitute -long contact with a region -does not appear to be suffi cient because it does not put others on notice that a claim of exclusion has been made. Besides, China has stated several times that it will resolve the South China Sea issues according to international law and the principles in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
If the historic claims do not resolve the question of ownership, then do the recent occupations of the islets lend weight to any of the claims? France made some minimal attempts to exert physical control over seven of the islets in the 1930s, but it was not until Japan entered the region in August 1938 that anything akin to "eff ective control" occurred. Japan used Itu Aba, the largest Spratly islet, as a submarine base to intercept shipping in the area. Th eir installations were abandoned in 1945, and, more recently, the islets have been occupied by others. In the Peace Treaty signed by Japan on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced its rights to the Spratlys, but no recipient was named. Taiwan has eff ectively controlled Itu Aba from 1946 to 1950 and from 1956 to the present. Vietnam has controlled many Spratly features since 1973. Th e Philippines has controlled some islets since 1978. Malaysia began controlling features in the southern portion of the area in 1983, and China began its eff orts to occupy islets in 1988. In each case, other nations have challenged the occupations. Th e result has been a crazy-quilt pattern of occupation and an uneasy stalemate. Nevertheless, some of these occupations may at some point ripen into a legitimate entitlement of sovereignty.
Is "contiguity" or geographical proximity relevant here? Malaysia, the Philippines, and even Vietnam argue that they are entitled to some or all of the Spratlys because these islands are near their main land territories. Contiguity was rejected in both the Clipperton and Palmas decisions, and was not a factor in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, but the argument has a persistent practical appeal. China, of course, thoroughly rejects it.
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In summary, international legal principles will not unambiguously resolve the competing sovereignty claims to the Spratlys. All the claims are weak, because the claimants cannot demonstrate continuous and eff ective occupation, administration, and control, as well as acquiescence by other claimants. Each claimant undoubtedly realizes that if the dispute was presented to a tribunal or arbitrator, it may not ultimately or completely prevail. An independent decision-maker is likely to allocate these tiny islets according to the common legal principles of equity and fairness. In the long run, each claimant might be better served by putting aside the issue of sovereignty over the islets and working with the other claimants to multilaterally develop the resources of the disputed area. Such an approach would not formally reject any of the claims, would allow each nation to maintain its legal position, and would also allow the resources to be developed for the benefi t of the people of the region.
Boundary Delimitation in the South China Sea
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Singapore are parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. As a formal matter, Taiwan does not appear to be eligible to be a party. Many countries have said that they view the Convention as expressing the customary international law that applies to ocean issues, and the ICJ has recognized that the central parts of the Convention are now customary international law. Th e Convention provides some guidance to resolve the South China Sea disputes, and other principles can be discovered through an examination of state practice.
Features Th at Are Submerged at High Tide Cannot Generate Maritime Zones
Th is traditional principle of customary international law is confi rmed in Article 121 of the Law of the Sea Convention. Claims to maritime zones based on reefs that are submerged at high tide, even if artifi cial structures have been built on them, are not valid.
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Do Any of the Spratly Islets Have the Capacity Under Article 121 to Generate EEZs or Continental Shelves?
Th e central question that must be addressed before the maritime boundary issues can be unraveled is whether any of the Spratly islets have the capacity to generate an EEZ or continental shelf. Between 25 and 35 of the 80-90 distinct features in the Spratly region are above water at high tide, and these outcroppings qualify as "islands" under Article 121 of the Law of the Sea Convention and appear to be entitled to territorial seas. As explained above, 147 however, Article 121(3) says that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own" do not generate EEZs or continental shelves.
Until recent times, the Spratlys were not inhabited except by occasional wandering fi shers. Although they were occasionally visited, they had no independent economic life of their own. Th e language in Article 121(3) appears to require that the relevant "economic life" of features must be "of their own." Th us an artifi cial economic life supported by a distant population in order to gain control over an extended maritime zone is not suffi cient.
Th e largest islet, Itu Aba, is 0.43 square kilometer in area. Spratly Island is 0.15 square kilometer and only fi ve others are larger than 0.1 square kilometer -Th itu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, and Sand Cay. Th e others are truly small. Th e highest feature is Namyit Island, at 6.2 meters. 148 Only ten of the islets appear to sustain trees naturally -Itu Aba, Loaita Island, Namyit, Nanshan Island, Northeast Cay, Sand Cay, Southwest Cay, Th itu Island, West York Island, and Sin Cowe.
149 Only a few of the islets have been used for guano exploitationSpratly Island and Amboyna and Southwest Cays. Itu Aba and Th itu have been used historically as regional bases for fi shers from Hainan Island and elsewhere.
In an earlier writing, I drew upon the writings of Gidel to suggest that only islands that have shown the ability to sustain stable human populations of at least 50 persons should be allowed to generate maritime zones, and that the Spratlys do not meet this requirement. 150 Other authors have reached similar conclusions regarding the inability of these islets to sustain human habitation and thus to generate EEZs or continental shelves. 151 More important is State practice. Vietnamese offi cials now appear to have adopted the view that the Spratly islets cannot generate EEZs or continental shelves. 152 Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia has also expressed that view. 153 Although the arguments against allowing any of the Spratlys to generate extended maritime zones seem strong, occasional authors continue to suggest that at least some of the islands can generate zones.
154 And China frequently acts as if it assumes the islets can generate extended zones.
It is most logical and practical to conclude that none of the Spratlys can generate any extended maritime zones, but if agreement cannot be reached on this approach, a fallback position might be to allow the islets to generate a "regional" zone that would be shared and jointly managed. Th is position would recognize that the Spratlys have been visited and, to some minimal extent, used by the people of the region for centuries, and that it should continue to be viewed as a shared resource. Th is conclusion has a precedent in the Gulf of Fonseca case, 155 where Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were recognized as having a "condominium" ownership over the waters and resources of the Gulf of Fonseca, which were characterized as jointly-owned historic waters. 
Are the Spratly Islets Th at Are Above Water at High Tide Entitled to Generate 12-Nautical-Mile Territorial Seas?
Article 3 of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention allows "Every State" to establish territorial seas around its land areas "to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles," and Article 121 allows every feature that is above water at high tide to generate such a zone. Vietnam declared a 12-n.m. territorial sea around the Spratlys in a 1977 statement 156 and China did so in its 1992 Territorial Sea Law. 157 One commentator has reported that Malaysia has claimed a 12-n.m. territorial sea around Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay but not around its other claimed features. 158 territorial seas of less than 12-n.m. around islands that are on the "wrong" side of a median boundary line. Th e Venezuelan island of Isla Patos, between Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago, the Abu Dhabi island of Dayyinah, between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, and the Australian islands in the Torres Strait, between Australia and Papua New Guinea, all have territorial seas of only three-n.m. 159 Th ese examples provide a logical precedent for the South China Sea, because these islands, like the Spratlys, are all small and have no permanent civilian population. Th e islands in the crowed Aegean Sea generate only six-n.m. territorial seas. 160 Hasjim Djalal has observed that the Spratly islets are not entitled to any territorial seas at all, and instead should simply be protected by small "safety zones." 161 Certainly the claimant parties could agree that the islets that are above water at high tide generate territorial seas of less than 12-n.m., and such an agreement would be consistent with the view that the resources of the region should be shared by the peoples of the region, or possibly by the international community as a whole.
What Continental Shelf Claims Can Be Made by the Claimant States?
Th e geography of the South China Sea presents an interesting challenge in interpreting and applying Article 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention. If one concludes that the Spratly islets do not have the capacity to generate EEZs or continental shelves, then these zones must be determined by reference to the continental land masses and the larger bordering islands. 
What Principles Govern the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries?
Once the diffi cult and complex issues identifi ed above are addressed and resolved, it then becomes appropriate to determine how the maritime boundaries in the region should be drawn. Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone adopted the "equidistance principle" as the method for resolving competing claims to surrounding waters. Under this principle, a disputed area is divided along a line equidistant between the countries involved. But the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention carefully avoided referring to "equidistance" as the proper approach, and instead provided in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) a carefully crafted formula that gives only subtle hints regarding how disputes should be resolved:
Th e delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [and continental shelf ] between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be eff ected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Th e goal is thus to achieve an "equitable" resolution to boundary disputes, and a variety of principles have been developed to achieve this goal. 162 Th e "equitable principle" with the most direct relevance to the South China Sea maritime boundary dispute is that islands do not have an equal capacity with land masses to generate maritime zones. Because of this principle, even if one or more of the tiny Spratly islets were deemed to be capable of generating extended maritime zones, they would not command equal strength with an opposing continental area or a larger island. Th e focus on control of the Spratlys may, therefore, be misdirected.
Islands can generate maritime zones, 163 but they do not generate full zones when they are competing directly against continental land areas. Th is conclusion has been reached consistently by the Court and arbitral tribunals. 164 Although the language of Article 121(3) would appear to dictate the result that the Spratly islets should not be allowed to generate any extended maritime zones, even if they are allowed to do so, their capacity to generate such a zone would be very weak in relation to competing claims from continental or large-island land masses. Because the features in the Spratly group are extremely tiny outcroppings, it is virtually certain that a tribunal would give these features only limited relevance in delimiting maritime boundaries.
Will High Seas Areas Remain After the Maritime Boundaries Are Delimited, and, If So, How Will Th is Area Be Governed?
If the Spratly islets are not permitted to generate extended maritime zones, and if the principles laid out in the Law of the Sea Convention are applied, then an area beyond national jurisdiction will remain in the center of the South China Sea. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, the fi shery resources in this zone would be governed by the freedom of the seas principle found in Article 87, as modifi ed by the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Migratory Stocks. 165 Th e seabed mineral and hydrocarbon resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, if any, which are of more importance to the South China Sea disputes, would apparently be governed by the International Sea-Bed Authority. It is unclear how that body would operate in a semi-enclosed sea such as the South China Sea. Outside powers would certainly need the approval of the International Sea-Bed Authority to explore and exploit sea-bed resources there. But it might also be appropriate to have a regional advisory board to ensure regional involvement in the decision-making.
A Shared Regional "Common Heritage"?
Although the Convention does not explicitly authorize this approach, it may be appropriate for the nations of this region to assert a regional claim of ownership over the resources of the South China Sea beyond areas of national jurisdiction. Th is result may be appropriate in light of the unique problem created by the ambiguity over whether the Spratly islets can generate extended maritime zones. Th e unusual 1992 decision of the ICJ Chamber in the Gulf of Fonseca Case concluding that El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua hold undivided interests in the maritime zones both landward and seaward of the closing line across the Gulf of Fonseca may provide a useful precedent for a solution to the South China Sea disputes.
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If one accepts the early Chinese contacts with the Spratlys, one has to also recognize that China was in some sense a colonial power over Vietnam and other areas of this region. Once this colonial domination ended, Vietnam and the other areas would logically have inherited the sovereign claims made by the colonial master, just as the Central American republics inherited the claims made by their colonial master, Spain. But the islets and the maritime space cannot be easily divided, because China still exists and still claims this region. It may therefore be appropriate to see the jurisdiction over the islets and the surrounding marine space as shared between China and Vietnam, as well as the other nations that were dominated by China in earlier periods.
It has also become increasingly common for countries to establish joint development areas in disputed maritime regions, and this approach may be a logical solution in the Spratly area. Jose de Venecia, a close confi dant of the then-President Fidel Ramos and a leading member of the Philippine Congress, introduced a resolution proposing a "condominium system: for the whole South China Sea." 167 Further, the then-Legal Adviser to the Philippine Department of Foreign Aff airs has stated that the marine resources of this region "should be explored, exploited and managed by all nations jointly for the benefi ts of all peoples." 168 In August 1995, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui proposed that the 12 nations and territories with interests in the region give up their claims to the disputed islets and invest $10 billion to establish a South China Sea Development Co. to develop the natural resources cooperatively. In 1990, in Singapore, Li Peng, who was then China's Premier, proposed that the question of sovereignty be set aside and the resources of the South China Sea be jointly developed. 170 It has never been clear what China's vision of joint development is, but it appears that it involves cooperating in areas where the other Southeast Asian nations have strong claims to ocean resources. In any event, this idea is clearly one worth exploring in more detail.
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Th e Claimant States Have a Duty to Cooperate in Managing the Resources and Protecting the Environment of a Semi-Enclosed Sea
Articles 122 and 123 of the Law of the Sea Convention establish the concept of a "semi-enclosed sea" and require the nations bordering such seas to cooperate with regard to a number of issues. Th e South China Sea meets the defi nition of a "semi-enclosed sea" under Article 122, because it consists "entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States." Article 123 provides that the coastal states "shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate regional organization" to coordinate (a) management, conservation, and exploitation of the living resources, (b) protection and preservation of the marine environment, and (c) scientifi c research.
X. Conclusion
Th ese unresolved sovereignty and maritime boundary issues create obstacles limiting the ability of the people of East Asia to exploit the resources of their coastal areas. Some disputes concern resources of potential value and some involve matters of substantial national importance related to historical wrongs. Th ey are complex, but are certainly capable of resolution. Because some controversies raise issues that are linked to other disputes, something of a gridlock exists, and not much eff ort has been expended recently to reach permanent solutions to these disagreements. Th e peoples of East Asia have reached pragmatic provisional solutions to many of their maritime controversies, 172 and permanent solutions will be found to these maritime boundary disputes when the countries involved perceive that it is in their political and economic interest to resolve them. 170 At a press conference in Singapore on Aug. 13 
